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Inspired by recent ideas on how the analysis of complex financial risks can benefit
from analogies with independent research areas, we propose an unorthodox frame-
work for mapping microfinance credit risk—a major obstacle to the sustainability of
lenders outreaching to the poor. Specifically, using the elements of network theory, we
constructed an agent-based model that obeys the stylised rules of microfinance indus-
try. We found that in a deteriorating economic environment confounded with adverse
selection, a form of latent moral hazard may cause a regime shift from a high to a
low loan repayment probability. An after-the-fact recovery, when possible, required
the economic environment to improve beyond that which led to the shift in the first
place. These findings suggest a small set of measurable quantities for mapping mi-
crofinance credit risk and, consequently, for balancing the requirements to reasonably
price loans and to operate on a fully self-financed basis. We illustrate how the proposed
mapping works using a 10-year monthly data set from one of the best-known micro-
finance representatives, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Finally, we discuss an entirely
new perspective for managing microfinance credit risk based on enticing spontaneous
cooperation by building social capital.
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INTRODUCTION
Contradictory evidence of the impact of microfinance
[1–4] has simultaneously been the root of high praise and
harsh criticism. Proponents argue that the benefit from
the access to credit makes microfinance an effective tool
for improving the welfare of the poor [5]. Conversely, op-
ponents accuse microfinance institutions (MFIs) of cre-
ating even more poverty [6], while some have gone so far
as to claim that MFIs may harbor private groups with
vested interest in perpetuating the current situation in
many poor regions of the world [7]. Both sides, despite
ideological differences, have devoted a great deal of de-
bate to the sustainability of microfinance, particularly
the reduction of information asymmetries [1, 8–10] and
the non-profit versus for-profit dilemma [1, 4, 8–11].
If an MFI is to operate sustainably, the need to bal-
ance reasonable pricing of loans (the social mission) with
self-financing through profits (the financial objective) ap-
pears to be of utmost importance [9, 12]. Achieving the
desired balance rests on the successful control of credit
risk, which is a task complicated by the fact that MFIs
often serve a network of borrowers without credit his-
tories. To address the issues involved, we build upon a
recent argument that by drawing analogies with indepen-
dent research areas it is possible to unravel the complex-
ities of financial risks [13–17]. Specifically, we treated
the network of borrowers served by an MFI as a dynami-
cal network, a versatile concept that has proven relevant
in studies of many real-world phenomena, including fi-
nance [18–24]. The dynamical network was set up to
obey the stylized rules of microfinance, where the opera-
tions of one of the best established representatives of the
industry, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh [1], constituted
a working template.
Microfinance in a nutshell
The distinctive idea of microfinance is outreach to the
poor. Every loan manager, accordingly, has the task to
recruit customers by visiting their villages and subse-
quently to organize management units, where each unit
covers several villages located near one another. A few
units make up a branch under a single manager (i.e. a
loan officer in a more traditional context). The impor-
tance of such a setup arises from the limited mobility
of the potential customers who usually reside away from
dense city centers, lack access to credit facilities, and oc-
casionally fall prey to loan sharks.
Another key idea behind microfinance is that the in-
tended purpose for the loans is not consumption. Instead,
borrowers are supposed to invest into small businesses
that can help boost their income. Each borrower is thus
expected to justify the loan with a rudimentary busi-
ness plan. The potential customers typically earn low
incomes, less than $5 US per person or about $2 to $30
US per household daily. A representative loan amount
is around $100 US, to be repaid in weekly installments
over a period of 52 weeks (one year) with a 20% nominal
interest rate [1]. To overcome the above-mentioned mo-
bility problem, the manager visits each unit once a week
to collect the installments.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
05
73
7v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.R
M
]  
22
 A
pr
 20
15
2Given that MFIs cannot rely on elaborate credit
history calculations, it was necessary to establish
microfinance-specific mechanisms for securing the regular
payment of installments. Originally, six customers con-
stituted a group, chose a leader from among themselves,
and shared liability for loans to the individual members.
Because of the shared liability, individual members were
subject to peer monitoring and pressure, further rein-
forced by loan access for other group members being re-
stricted in the case of a default (dynamic incentive). Cur-
rently, borrowing implies only individual liability, yet the
group structure still exists, presumably to retain some of
the benefits of group lending [1, 8, 9, 25]. Furthermore,
all borrowers belonging to a unit (i.e. about 10 groups)
are supposed to attend the weekly meeting with the man-
ager and pay their installments publicly.
Other aspects of microfinance intended to encourage
borrowers to comply include compulsory savings, divi-
dends, and access to higher loans subject to an exemplary
past performance. When borrowers open an account with
the bank, they are supposed to save a certain percentage
of the loan amount. Although access to these savings
is limited, the borrower does obtain certain shareholder
rights and is entitled to a dividend. Moreover, borrowers
are motivated to stick to the payment schedule because
an exemplary performance qualifies them for a progres-
sively higher loan amount in the future. For successful
MFIs such as Grameen bank, these mechanisms are suf-
ficient to ensure a payment probability of around 95%
[1, 12].
Overview of the modeling framework
Several assumptions, motivated by Grameen’s opera-
tions, regulate the network dynamics. First, borrowers
are represented as agents (i.e. equal-sized nodes of the
network) that can be in an active (paying installments)
or an inactive (defaulted) state. The total fraction of ac-
tive agents, f , indicates the overall state of the network.
Second, agents can switch from an active to an inactive
state with the probability pint to account for the pos-
sibility that some borrowers may default due to owning
unsuccessful small enterprises. These events are called in-
trinsic failures. Third, agents are connected (i.e. posses
information on each other’s state) in the sense of network
theory because MFIs entice peer monitoring [1, 8, 9, 25]
by forming groups of borrowers. Several groups make a
unit whose members meet weekly with a loan manager
to pay their installments publicly. One manager controls
a branch comprised of multiple units from within a geo-
graphically limited area. The size of the network is deter-
mined by the number of managers employed by a particu-
lar MFI. To account for such a structure, we set up a hier-
archical network in a way that n1 < n2 < n3 < n4 agents
corresponding to a group, a unit, a branch, and the whole
MFI, respectively, are connected with the probabilities
q1 > q2 > q3 > q4, respectively. Agents connected to
each other are referred to as neighbors. Fourth, if a cer-
tain critical fraction of neighbors, th, turns inactive, an
agent is tempted—with the small probability pext—to
purposely do the same [22, 23, 26]. Such an extrinsic
failure accounts for the latent moral hazard of strate-
gic default when borrowers become wary of the willing-
ness of other borrowers to continue honoring their loan
agreements [6, 27, 28]. The last, fifth assumption of the
network dynamics is that the inactive agents in the net-
work, irrespective of whether they failed intrinsically or
extrinsically, recover after a time τ because unsuccessful
borrowers may have their payments rescheduled or may
be issued new loans to jump-start their businesses. The
recovery time has two components, τ = τ0+∆τ , where τ0
is a certain minimum time needed for loan managers to
address the problems of borrowers in default and ∆τ is an
exponentially distributed random variable [23] with the
standard deviation σ, measuring the diverse abilities of
the managers. A complete description of the model can
be found in the Methods section, including the derivation
of a deterministic analogue. For reference, a summary of
mathematical symbols is given in Table I. In what follows,
our main interest is in applying the introduced dynami-
cal network to identify the effect of the key parameters
(th, pext, τ0, and σ) on the fraction of active agents (f)
given the outside forcing (pint).
RESULTS
To sustainably provide loans to borrowers not served
by the traditional financial system, MFIs are critically de-
pendent on a high loan payment probability, itself largely
driven by the economic environment in which a given
MFI operates. We therefore examined the performance of
the network of borrowers within a deteriorating economic
environment by using the described dynamical frame-
work (Fig. 1). For fixed values of th, pext, τ0, and σ,
the results showed that the performance as measured by
the fraction of active agents (f) responds linearly to the
probability of intrinsic failure (pint) up to a certain point.
When the value of pint increases sufficiently, the high rate
of intrinsic failures drives the fraction of inactive neigh-
bors of some agents close to the critical value, th, causing
extrinsic failures to occur for the first time. The dynam-
ical network thereafter undergoes a regime shift evident
from a highly nonlinear decline in f (Fig. 1). Addition-
ally, the recovery of the network can be delayed, meaning
that pint must be lower than the value that caused the
downward regime shift before the fraction of active agents
undergoes the reverse shift. In some cases, recovery is al-
together absent. To understand these patterns better, we
proceeded with a systematic analysis of the dynamics.
We began the analysis by observing how the fraction of
3TABLE I. List of mathematical symbols in alphabetical
order.
Symbol Description
E prob. of critically inactive neighborhood
F (l) DFA auto-correlation function
Fext(t) number of agents failing extrinsically at t
Fint(t) number of agents failing intrinsically at t
Ftot(t) total number of agents failing at t
Rext(t) no. of ext. failed agents recovering at t
Rint(t) no. of int. failed agents recovering at t
Rtot(t) total number of agents recovering at t
c proportionality constant
f fraction of active agents
f∗ equilibrium fraction of active agents
f∗+ high-f equilibrium
f∗− low-f equilibrium
l scale or lag
mi empirical moments
next(t) fraction of extrinsically failed agents at t
ni network size parameters
nint(t) fraction of intrinsically failed agents at t
pext extrinsic failure probability
pint intrinsic failure probability
pint empirical average of pint
qi connectedness probabilities
s(t) smoothing spline
s average of s(t)
th fractional threshold
∆pint(t) zero-mean smooth forcing function
∆τ random component of τ
α scaling exponent of F (l)
σ standard deviation of ∆pint(t)
τ recovery time
τ average recovery time
τ0 minimum recovery time
active agents changes with time when the probability of
intrinsic failure, pint, is kept constant (Fig. 2a). Several
important aspects of the dynamical network are revealed
this way. The performance as measured by the fraction of
active agents, f , converges to an equilibrium, f∗. There
are two types of equilibria, one with a high and one with a
low fraction of active agents, denoted f∗+ and f
∗
−, respec-
tively. Convergence to a high-f or a low-f equilibrium
depends on the value of pint and, somewhat surprisingly,
on the initial state, in which all inactive agents are as-
sumed to have failed intrinsically and have had their re-
covery time drawn from the exponential distribution with
the parameter σ. The dependence on the initial state is
exemplified by the two dashed curves in Fig. 2a, which,
although generated with the same value of pint, converge
to equilibria of different types. Before turning to the im-
plications of these outcomes, we first explore the origin
of the two types of equilibria.
In the equilibrium state, by definition, rates at which
FIG. 1. Time evolution of the dynamical network in
a stylized economic downturn. The probability of intrin-
sic failure, pint, steadily increases (decreases) throughout the
first (second) half of the simulation at a rate 3.854×10−6 per
time-step, symbolizing a deteriorating (recovering) economic
environment. The network is seen switching between regimes
with high and low fractions of active agents, f . Depending
on the probability of extrinsic failure, pext, the network per-
formance may lag behind that of the economy (red curve) or
it may never return to the high-f regime (blue curve). Other
parameter values are th = 0.2, τ0 = 7, and σ = 30. In all sim-
ulations, n1 = 6, n2 = 60, n3 = 420, with the total number of
agents set to n4 ≈ 104 for computational reasons. The con-
nectedness probabilities are q1 = 1, q2 = 0.7, and q3 = 0.05,
and q4 is constrained so that the total average number of
connections is 100 [29]. The scale for pint is reversed and
magnified 32 times for easier visual comparison.
agents fail and recover are the same. As long as the over-
all equilibrium fraction of active agents in the network,
f∗, is sufficiently high, the majority of agents will be
aware of a fraction of inactive neighbors below the crit-
ical value th. In this case, all failures are intrinsic and
the equilibrium failure rate is simply f∗pint. Worsening
performance of the network complicates matters because
it increases the probability (denoted E) of having a crit-
ically inactive neighborhood, i.e. the probability that a
randomly chosen agent has a fraction of inactive neigh-
bors higher than th. Therefore, in addition to intrinsic
failures, the remaining active agents in the equilibrium
state, f∗(1 − pint), can fail extrinsically, increasing the
total failure rate by f∗(1−pint)Epext. The recovery rate
is determined by the reciprocal of the average time to
recovery, τ = τ0 + σ, and the fraction of inactive agents,
1 − f∗, producing the term (1 − f∗)/τ . By balancing
failure and recovery rates, and solving for f∗, we get
f∗ =
1
1 + (pint + Epext − Epintpext)τ . (1)
From this equation, in the limits E → 0 and E → 1,
we obtain high-f (f∗+) and low-f (f
∗
−) equilibria, respec-
tively. When the conditions pintτ  1 and Epextτ  1
are satisfied, a series expansion of Eq. (1) yields f∗ ≈
1 − (pint + Epext − Epintpext)τ , which is the result re-
ported by Ref. [22] after assuming independent intrin-
4FIG. 2. Two types of equilibria and the regime shift.
(a) The performance of the dynamical network as measured
by f converges either to a high-f or a low-f equilibrium, de-
pending on the probability of intrinsic failure, pint, and the
initial state. The parameter pint ranges from 0.001 (triangles)
to 0.005 (stars) in increments of 0.001. The dependence on
the initial state is exemplified by the dashed curves, which
converge to different equilibria although both were generated
with the same pint. (b) The equilibrium states (f
∗) of the
dynamical network form a hysteresis loop. Numerical results
(black) compare favorably with the analytically derived high-
f and low-f equilibria (red and blue curves, respectively; see
Eq. (1) and its limits in the text). A major consequence of
hysteresis is that the recovery of the network lags that of
the economy, because the probability of intrinsic failure, pint,
causing a shift from a high-f to a low-f regime is larger than
the corresponding probability permitting the opposite regime
shift. Parameter values are th = 0.2, pext = 0.009, τ0 = 7,
and σ = 30.
sic and extrinsic failures. This mean-field approxima-
tion works much better for regular, as opposed to Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi, networks [22], and the larger the system the more
appropriate it becomes. The other terms in the series
(not shown) originate from the fact that intrinsic and ex-
trinsic failures in our model are dependent. The insight
gained from Eq. (1) and its limits puts us in a better
position to understand the implications of the previously
described outcomes, but before discussing these implica-
tions, we first present an additional visual aid.
The visual aid in question (Fig. 2b) is a plot that shows
how the equilibrium state (f∗) depends on the probabil-
ity of intrinsic failure (pint). The most prominent feature
of the plot is that the equilibrium states of the dynami-
cal network form a hysteresis loop. Namely, the critical
value of pint causing the shift from a high-f to a low-
f equilibrium is larger than the corresponding critical
value at which the opposite shift is possible. An immedi-
ate consequence is that the convergence depends on the
initial state, as demonstrated in Fig. 2a, or, more gener-
ally, on the path traversed by the fraction of active agents
over time. Another consequence is the delayed recovery
illustrated in Fig. 1. In fact, when the parameter val-
ues are such that the returning branch of the hysteresis
loop (dashed curve in Fig. 2b) gets pushed beyond the
range of possible forcings (i.e. below pint = 0, which is
accomplished, for instance, by increasing pext), a recov-
ery is no longer observed. We next argue that important
insights into microfinance credit risk management follow
from these results and extensions thereof, shown in the
form of the phase diagrams.
When estimating risk, it is crucial to find out how far
the parameters of a given dynamical system are from the
regions of the parameter space characterized by high in-
stability. We therefore use phase diagrams to present a
comprehensive overview of the dynamics as a function
of the parameter values. These diagrams are referred to
as risk maps because of the assumed link between the
dynamics and credit risk. For a given value of the prob-
ability of intrinsic failure (pint), which is, as stated be-
fore, beyond the control of MFIs, we can produce three
two-dimensional risk maps (Fig. 3), one in the th − pext
plane (constant τ = τ0 + σ), another in the th − τ plane
(constant pext), and the last one in the pext − τ plane
(constant th). Each of the three risk maps shows three
distinct regimes of the network dynamics. Regime I is
characterized by a high equilibrium fraction of active
agents, f∗+, thus carrying little credit risk for the MFI.
In contrast, regime III has a low equilibrium fraction of
active agents, f∗−, such that the network can never re-
enter regime I even if the probability of intrinsic failure
improves to pint = 0. Regime III, consequently, implies
a high credit risk for an MFI and needs to be avoided
at all cost. Intermediate regime II generally leads to the
low-f equilibrium, f∗−, from which it is always possible
to recover provided the probability pint improves suffi-
ciently. In addition, for small values of pext (roughly
< 0.005; not shown), some paths satisfy f∗− < f < f
∗
+ for
an indeterminate period of time because the fraction of
failed neighbors ends up distributed around the critical
fraction, th. Mathematically, we have 0 < E < 1. These
paths always permit a recovery and hence qualitatively
belong to regime II. In the context of managing microfi-
nance credit risk, regime II implies a necessity for caution
and it should prompt actions aimed at restoring better
performance. By classifying the network dynamics into
three distinct regimes and identifying their respective im-
plications for credit risk management, we have made the
connection between the dynamics and risk more appar-
ent, but we have yet to specify the factors controlling the
prevalence of each regime.
The risk maps (Fig. 3) reveal the factors that promote
the prevalence of each of the network dynamics regimes.
Here, it is useful to recall that the smaller the value of
th and the larger the value of pext, the more an agent
depends on its neighbors. When the average time to
agent recovery, τ = τ0 + σ, is constant (Fig. 3a), a high
enough value of th always keeps the network in regime I.
This result is understandable given that the probability
of extrinsic failure, pext, plays a role in the dynamics only
if the intrinsic failure rate is sufficient by itself to raise
5FIG. 3. Risk maps for credit risk evaluation. We are in-
terested in where the real-world lender’s parameters are situ-
ated relative to the region of the phase space characterized by
high instability. Our model depends on three parameters, but
instead of a three-dimensional phase space, we plot risk maps
in three separate two-dimensional phase planes. The model
exhibits three distinct behaviors depending on the parameter
values: a high-f regime (I), a low-f regime with recovery (II),
and a low-f regime without recovery (III). (a) Phase diagram
in the th-pext plane with constant τ = τ0 + σ, where τ0 = 7
and σ = 30. (b) Phase diagram in the th-τ plane with con-
stant pext = 0.009. (c) Phase diagram in the pext-τ plane
with constant th = 0.2. The probability of intrinsic failure is
pint = 0.004. Shown are the numerical results and curves of
best fit.
the fraction of failed neighbors of an agent to the level of
th. If th is high enough, we may never observe such an
outcome. Conversely, a decreasing value of th generally
forces the network to jump from regime I to II, unless pext
is sufficiently high to force a direct transition to regime
III. Qualitatively different behavior is observed when pext
is held constant and τ is allowed to change (Fig. 3b). In
this case, for any value of th, recoveries from failures
can be sufficiently slow (i.e. τ sufficiently high) that the
network transitions first from regime I to II and then from
regime II to III. However, direct transitions from regime
I to III are impossible. Finally, when th is held constant
(Fig. 3c), an increasing τ first drives the network from
regime I to II and then from regime II to III, unless again
pext is sufficiently high for a direct transition to regime
III to be possible. In addition to mapping microfinance
credit risk in the described manner, we can also consider
the question if there are any early-warning signs that
could be exploited to mitigate or even avoid the negative
impact of a regime shift.
As a critical point is approached, complex dynamical
systems often become less attracted to the equilibrium
state, experiencing bigger displacements and slower re-
coveries from perturbations [30]. This phenomenon—
dubbed critical slowing down—should, therefore, reveal
itself through a larger standard deviation and longer cor-
relation of the state variables. In Fig. 4a, we show that a
gradual increase in the probability parameter pext causes
the standard deviations of the fractions of active and ex-
trinsically failed agents to spike when the dynamical net-
work approaches a critical point during the shift from
regime I to regime II. Because spiking begins notice-
ably before the regime shift, this critical slowing down
may be used as an early-warning indicator of a network
breakdown [30]. We also conducted a detrended fluctu-
ations analysis (DFA) [31] to analyze auto-correlation in
the model outputs (Fig. 4b). The DFA auto-correlation
function is of the form F (l) ∝ lα, where l is the scale
(lag) and α is an exponent measuring the strength of the
correlation. When α < 12 (α >
1
2 ) two consecutive dis-
placements of the network state—e.g. of the fraction of
active agents f—are more likely to be in the opposite
(same) direction. The exponent α = 12 indicates no cor-
relation. In our dynamical network, for small pext, we
observe (Fig. 4b) a finite-range auto-correlation of the
random-walk type (α ≈ 1.5), but its strength gradually
diminishes at larger scales [23]. However, as the network
undergoes the regime shift at pext = 0.006, the auto-
correlation exhibits considerable strength even at large
scales. Once pext takes the network decisively into regime
II, the strength of the auto-correlation is again similar to
that observed in the case of small pext. Accordingly, we
identified two potential early-warning indicators comple-
mentary to the microfinance credit risk mapping, both
of which could help mitigate the negative impact of a
regime shift.
Empirical analysis
To interpret the real-world microfinance data (Fig. 5a)
in the context of our modeling framework, we performed
an empirical analysis by estimating the model parame-
ters from the available data set using the method of mo-
ments (see the Methods section). Upon obtaining the pa-
rameter estimates, we conducted simulations to visually
compare the data set and the model outputs (Fig. 5b).
The results of the empirical analysis indicate a very small
probability of intrinsic failure, pint = 3.7 × 10−4 per
day, which is equivalent to saying that each month about
1.1% of the Grameen’s network of active borrowers is at
risk of default. Such a low percentage is quite reason-
able given that Grameen Bank is a successful MFI that
has been maintaining a high loan payment probability
6FIG. 4. Early-warning indicators of a regime shift. (a)
Standard deviations of the fractions of active and extrinsi-
cally failed agents spike as the dynamical network undergoes
a shift from regime I to regime II at pext = 0.006 (cf. Fig. 3a,
c). (b) Auto-correlation at the network level due to agent
failures exhibits a longer memory close to the regime shift at
pext = 0.006 (cf. Fig. 3a, c). In detrended fluctuation anal-
ysis (DFA) the strength of the correlation is reflected in the
scaling exponent, α (corresponding to the slope in the log-
arithmic plot). Lines with slopes α = 1.5 and α = 0.5 (no
correlation) are plotted for easier visual comparison. Param-
eter values are th = 0.2, τ0 = 7, and σ = 30. The probability
of intrinsic failure is pint = 0.004.
for over three decades. The estimated critical fraction,
th = 0.0695, is also small, pointing to two plausible inter-
pretations. First, aside from a very general rationale [29],
we had no evidence for letting the number of neighbors
saturate at around 100, and therefore may have chosen a
level that is too high to reflect reality. If so, the estimate
of the threshold th should be rather low. Second, because
the estimated critical fraction of the average number of
neighbors (i.e. 7% of 100) is about the same as the size
of borrowing groups (6 people), it would seem that finan-
cial decisions of borrowers are determined by the status
of their most immediate neighbors. For a borrower in
a critically inactive neighborhood, the probability of ex-
trinsic failure, pext = 0.0019 per day, suggests that there
is a less than 5.8% chance for a strategic default to occur
in the next month. If the borrower defaults, the average
time to recovery consistent with the data is τ = 39.85
days. The obtained parameter values put Grameen Bank
rather firmly into the domain of regime I (Fig. 5c), as
could be expected from the successful operations of this
MFI. However, the low value of th is a reason for some
concern should the economic environment deteriorate.
DISCUSSION
Reducing the major credit risks of MFIs to just a few
parameters, as we have done herein, offers practical path-
ways to risk mapping and management, similar in spirit
to the approach used by Ref. [15]. To illustrate this idea,
FIG. 5. Data set, comparison with model runs, and
the risk map for Grameen bank. (a) The data set con-
tains monthly information on amounts due that were actually
paid to Grameen bank between June 2002 and Jan 2013. A
long-term trend observable in the data is extracted using a
smoothing spline, s(t). The trend suggests that the model
forcing is of the form pint(t) = pint +∆pint(t), where pint is a
constant and ∆pint(t) a zero-mean smooth function of time.
(b) Comparison of the data set with typical model runs re-
veals satisfactory agreement between the two. For the forcing
term, we assume ∆pint(t) = c[s(t) − s], where c = − 18 and s
is the average of s(t). (c) Estimated model parameters place
Grameen bank in regime I (x-mark) as could be expected
from one of the most successful microfinance representatives.
Even in the wake of 2007-2008 financial crisis, Grameen Bank
continues to operate in the low risk regime (star) despite the
more challenging economic environment.
consider that the parameters th and pext describe the risk
arising from the latent moral hazard of a strategic default
[6, 27, 28]. In particular, th is the critical point at which
borrowers start doubting the positive value of further co-
operation with the lending program. The value of cooper-
ation may be perceived differently by different individual
borrowers, but the important question is how MFIs can
strengthen that perception in a general manner. Here we
refer to new ideas, independent of the established mech-
anisms of strict group liability with peer selection and
monitoring. The latter mechanisms certainly play an
effective role in reducing information asymmetries, but
they also transfer the costs of screening and identifying
delinquents from lenders to borrowers [25, 32] without
guaranteeing lower interest rates in return (especially in
the case of a for-profit lender). By contrast, improving
the perception of the value of cooperation tends to raise
social capital by lowering the transaction costs of working
7towards common goals [33, 34]. A good example might be
educational activities, which, although primarily aimed
at raising human capital, also have the capacity to “en-
gender goodwill and sentiments of reciprocity” [35]. Fur-
thermore, emphasis on building social capital may have
an additional positive effect of lowering the probability of
extrinsic failure, pext. This presumed effect is because so-
cial capital is based on relations of trust, reciprocity, and
connectedness in networks [33], all of which help not only
to establish but also maintain spontaneous cooperation
[34].
In our numerical simulations, we gave priority to con-
ceptual simplicity over maximum realism. This simplifi-
cation by no means precludes extending the model within
the network theory framework to accommodate addi-
tional aspects of reality relevant to microfinance credit
risk management. For instance, decaying networks could
be used to model permanent defaults [6] by excluding in-
trinsically failed agents with infinite recovery times. Dy-
namical networks could also be used to imitate mecha-
nisms of moral hazard complementary to the one we have
already described. An example would be failed connec-
tions between agents [23] when the information exchange
is interrupted as a consequence of lax peer monitoring
[6, 9]. Additionally, new agents could be allowed to enter
the network, leading to a class of models that explicitly
incorporates outreach as a vital component of microfi-
nance industry [4, 9]. Finally, competition between two
or more MFIs [10] could be modeled in a setting where
networks of borrowers overlap, allowing more robust net-
works to take over parts of more fragile ones. We there-
fore conclude that the concept of dynamical networks
makes a promising new tool for analyzing open questions
in microfinance with the potential for greatly improving,
if not revolutionizing, the perception of sustainability in
this industry.
METHODS
We constructed an agent-based model mimicking the
characteristics of an MFI by surmising that network the-
ory is a natural framework for such a construct. Agents
(i.e. equal-sized nodes of the network) represent bor-
rowers, who can be in an active or an inactive state.
The active state signifies that the borrower is regularly
paying installments, whereas the inactive state indicates
that the borrower is currently unable to pay or refusing
to continue with the payments. The overall success of
the MFI is indicated by the fraction of active agents, f ,
which serves as a proxy for the loan payment probability.
An agent can fail intrinsically (i.e. switch from an ac-
tive to an inactive state) as the involuntary consequence
of owning an unsuccessful small enterprise. The prob-
ability of intrinsic failure, pint, is small because at any
moment most enterprises are expected to continue doing
business as usual. However, pint increases in a deterio-
rating economic environment or if the lender is unable
to discriminate against risky borrowers with limited col-
lateral (adverse selection). The described formalism is
similar to that in Ref. [22] with the exception that here
pint is conditional on agents being in the active state.
Otherwise, agents in the inactive state could fail again,
which would correspond to multiple defaults of a single
borrower. We assume that such multiple defaults are
impossible. Finally, because the probability of intrinsic
failure is beyond the control of MFIs, this variable can
be considered as a forcing for the model.
In contrast to intrinsic failure, an owner of a success-
ful small enterprise may be hesitant to pay scheduled
installments for extrinsically motivated considerations.
These considerations are based on the availability of in-
formation on how regularly other borrowers service their
loan obligations. We assume that two agents are con-
nected in the usual sense of network theory if each of
them knows whether the other one is currently active.
Given the way microfinance operations are set up, it is
quite certain that such knowledge is common among the
members of the same group. The situation becomes pro-
gressively more opaque as the geographical reach extends
from the group to a management unit, a branch, and, ul-
timately, the whole MFI. Thus, we set up a hierarchical
network in a way that n1 < n2 < n3 < n4 agents cor-
responding to a group, a unit, a branch, and the whole
institution, respectively, are connected with the probabil-
ities q1 > q2 > q3 > q4, respectively. The size parameters
(ni) can be constrained by observing Grameen’s opera-
tions with roughly 6 persons per group, 10 groups per
unit, and 7 units per branch. The connectedness prob-
abilities (qi) are more loosely constrained by the facts
that the group structure and weekly unit meetings guar-
antee information exchange, a branch covers a limited
geographic area, and the average total number of connec-
tions per agent should saturate at around 100 [29]. We
assume that, as suggested by the Watts model [26] and
additionally explored by Refs. [22, 23], if a certain crit-
ical fraction of neighbors, th, turns inactive, an agent is
tempted—with the small probability pext—to purposely
do the same. Such an assumption accounts for the la-
tent moral hazard of strategic default when borrowers no
longer believe that other borrowers will continue honor-
ing their loan agreements [6, 27, 28]. Note that the larger
the value of th, and the smaller the value of pext, the less
an agent depends on its neighbors. The parameter pext
is, similarly to the forcing pint, conditional on agents be-
ing in the active state. Furthermore, the failure is said
to be extrinsic because the available information on the
state of the other agents prompts a voluntary reaction.
In microfinance every failure is addressed by a branch
manager. Unsuccessful borrowers may have their pay-
ments rescheduled or may be issued new loans to jump-
start their businesses. Accordingly, we assume that the
8inactive agents in the network, irrespective of whether
they failed intrinsically or extrinsically, recover after a
time τ . Because the manager cannot resolve issues im-
mediately, the time to recovery is greater than a certain
minimum time, τ0. Managers may also vary in their abil-
ity to handle the problems that led to the failure, which
is why the recovery time has a random component [23],
∆τ , so that τ = τ0 + ∆τ . The random variable ∆τ is
assumed to be exponentially distributed with the stan-
dard deviation σ, a measure of the diverse abilities of
the managers. One of the properties of the exponential
distribution is that σ also serves as the expectation of
the random variable ∆τ , thus giving the expected time
to recovery τ = τ0 + σ. With these specifications, we
are finally in a position to define that an agent is in the
inactive state if it has failed either intrinsically or extrin-
sically, and if the time since failure is less than the time
to recovery. Otherwise, the agent is in the active state.
A reader keen on better understanding the intricacies of
the described model may benefit from the derivation of
a deterministic analogue below. Mathematical symbols
appearing throughout are given in Table I.
Deterministic model
We derive deterministic equations that govern the time
evolution of the average number of active, intrinsically
failed, and extrinsically failed agents. Let us denote
these quantities by f(t), nint(t), and next(t), respectively.
The change in f(t) is given by the difference in the to-
tal number of recovering, Rtot(t), and failing, Ftot(t),
agents at an arbitrary moment t. For recoveries, we have
Rtot(t) = [1 − f(t − τ)]/τ because out of 1 − f(t − τ)
agents that are in the failed state at t− τ , only the frac-
tion 1/τ can recover at t. For failures, we have Ftot(t) =
Fint(t) + Fext(t) = f(t)pint + f(t)(1 − pint)E(t)pext be-
cause (i) only active agents can fail, (ii) intrinsic failures
have priority over extrinsic ones (i.e. the latter are con-
ditional on the former not happening at the same time),
and (iii) the probability of an agent having a critically
inactive neighborhood is E(t). Furthermore, it holds by
definition that Rtot(t+ τ) = Ftot(t) which yields
f(t) =
1
1 + [pint + E(t)(pext − pintpext)]τ . (2)
It is now apparent that the equilibrium fraction of ac-
tive agents, f∗—given in Eq. (1)—follows from Eq. (2)
as the time dependence of the probability E(t) wanes.
Next, looking at the number of recoveries from intrin-
sic, Rint(t), and extrinsic, Rext(t), failures separately,
the same logic as before dictates Rint(t) = nint(t− τ)/τ
and Rext(t) = next(t − τ)/τ . The definitions imply
Rint(t+ τ) = Fint(t) and Rext(t+ τ) = Fext(t), resulting
in
nint(t) = τf(t)pint, (3a)
next(t) = τf(t)(1− pint)E(t)pext. (3b)
Using Eqs. (2, 3a, and 3b) a quick check gives f(t) +
nint(t)+next(t) = 1 as it should be. We thus see that the
underlying dynamics of our model are relatively simple,
yet able to generate rather complex dynamical phenom-
ena owing to the stochasticity and a small set of rules
that determine how E(t) depends on time.
Empirical analysis
Real-world microfinance data can be interpreted in
the context of our modeling framework by estimating
the model parameters from the data. An appropriate
method for doing so is the method of moments. We apply
this method to a 10-year monthly data set, consisting of
loan collection probabilities recorded by Grameen Bank
from June 2002 to January 2013. Stated more precisely,
“loan collection probabilities” mean the percentage of the
amounts due that were actually paid, which is compati-
ble with the model output f . One difficulty in estimating
the model parameters is the apparent trend in the data
(Fig. 5a), suggesting a time-dependent forcing of the form
pint(t) = pint + ∆pint(t), where pint is a constant and
∆pint(t) a zero-mean smooth function of time. We there-
fore use a smoothing spline, s(t), to extract the trend and
then, during the estimation, treat pint as just another
parameter. To keep the total number of parameters at a
computationally manageable level, we assume without a
major loss of generality that the minimum time to recov-
ery, τ0, is seven days. Altogether we aim at reproducing
the first four moments of the available data set, i.e. the
mean (m1), the standard deviation (m
1/2
2 ), the standard-
ized skewness (m3/m
3/2
2 ), and the standardized kurtosis
(m4/m
2
2). At the point of best fit, the empirical moments
compare favorably with the model-generated ones (mean
± s.d. from 500 runs): 0.9805 vs. 0.9833±0.0004, 0.0023
vs. 0.0023 ± 0.0002, -0.9133 vs. −0.2907 ± 0.2705, and
4.0024 vs. 3.0238 ± 0.5994 for the mean, the standard
deviation, the standardized skewness, and the standard-
ized kurtosis, respectively. A comparison of the origi-
nal data set with three typical model runs is shown in
Fig. 5b. In these simulations, we assume that the time-
dependent forcing is ∆pint(t) = c[s(t) − s], where c is
a proportionality constant set to − 18 and s is the aver-
age of s(t). Such an assumption is justifiable in regime
I (Fig. 1). Finally, with reasonable agreement between
the data and the model results, we construct a risk map
for Grameen bank analogous to those shown in Fig. 3.
In this case, however, we use a pext-pint phase diagram
(Fig. 5c), where the probability of intrinsic failure should
be interpreted as the average forcing, pint.
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